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INTRODUCTION

" .. like FirstAmendment mannafrom heaven....

Some of the thorniest problems of communications law and policy
were supposed to have been solved by the Internet.2 The issue of who

can speak, or access the means of speech, was said to have been solved
by the arrival of ubiquitous, relatively cheap access to the Internet. The
problem of media concentration was supposed to have been solved now

that so many more speakers could contribute. Like "First Amendment
manna from heaven," the Internet thus seemed to offer a solution to the
vexing communications policy problems of scarcity, diversity, and

access.
As it turns out, we might have been too quick. While the Internet
has undoubtedly assisted with these problems, the early optimism 3 must
now be tempered by the recognition that new gatekeepers have arisen,
and that their actions are not necessarily supportive of the values
underlying the right of free speech.4 Yet, we now know that it is
structurally possible to have a communications environment in which
there is rough equality of access to a major means of mass

1. Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1653, 1669 (1998) (describing the high expectations observers had for the Internet).
2. The enthusiasm is reflected in the language of the Supreme Court in Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union:
This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes not only traditional
print and news services, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive,
real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.
Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can
become a pamphleteer. As the District Court found, "the content on the Internet is as
diverse as human thought."
521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
3.

See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE

VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 191-92 (2001); Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User
Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media,
104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1619 (1995) ("[T]he deployment of innovative new technologies-such as
high-capacity computer networks ...and increasingly accessible online services-heralds the
arrival of new, interactive communications media."); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It
Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1806-07 (1995) (stating that new information technology will reduce
the cost of speech and lead to a "more democratic and diverse" media environment).
4. Others have raised concerns about the effect of the Internet on social solidarity and
democratic debate. They have warned of the fragmentation of society into narrowly defined and
increasingly extremist speech communities, as well as the loss of broadly shared media experiences.
See generally RICHARD MOON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

211-13 (2000); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 51-88 (2001) (discussing group polarization on
the Internet).
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communication-both as speaker and as listener-that smaller speakers
and speakers addressing minority interests can find an audience, and that
listeners can have much more autonomy in their choice of information.
Any argument for a deviation from these gains must be justified against
this background; it is not enough simply to say that such things are
utopian.
Forty years ago, Professor Jerome Barron wrote an important article
in which he noted that the right to free speech was more romantic myth
than reality when access to the means of effective mass speech were
closed to novel and unpopular ideas. He argued for a broader
understanding of the right to free speech, encompassing more than the
traditional freedom from government censorship. Instead, he argued,
free speech should encompass a right of access to the media. 6 While the
problem of access to the means of speech seems to have been greatly
alleviated by the Internet, the chokepoint has now shifted downstream to
a class of intermediaries that select and filter information en route to
listeners.7 Examples of this class of "selection intermediaries" include
search engines, software filters, Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") that
block or filter content, and spam blocklists.
Selection intermediaries are necessary because, under conditions of
overwhelmingly abundant information of varying quality, listeners must
discriminate amongst speakers. We simply cannot pay attention to it all,
and the task of finding or avoiding information increases in difficulty in
proportion to the amount of information available. Search engines find
information, but equally importantly, they offer some assessment of
5. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1641, 1641 (1967):

Our constitutional theory is in the grip of a romantic conception of free expression, a
belief that the "marketplace of ideas" is freely accessible. But if ever there were a selfoperating marketplace of ideas, it has long ceased to exist. The mass media's
development of an antipathy to ideas requires legal intervention if novel and unpopular

ideas are to be assured a forum ....
6. Id. at 1666-78.
7. See Lucas Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Defining the Web: The Politics of Search
Engines, COMPUTER, Jan. 2000, at 54, 61.
Many have observed that for the Web to become a democratizing technology and a

public good, we must first take the question of access seriously. We agree, but would
define the question in broader terms. Access is not merely a computer and a network
hookup, even when coupled with the skills and know-how that enable effective use.
Rather, access implies a comprehensive mechanism for finding and being found. Thus
our concern with the politics of search engines-a politics that at present seems to push
the Web in a direction that favors special interests at the expense of marginalizing the
general public.
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what is most useful. In theory, filters permit sensitive listeners to avoid
information so that everyone else can still speak or listen if they wish.
ISPs can protect their subscribers from the influx of spam or malicious
communications and can offer an information selection service through
their portals. These are the positive stories. There are also numerous
stories of how these selection intermediaries undermine the flow of
information from speaker to listener. They do so by censoring content
and applying bases for discrimination that listeners would not have
chosen, in a manner that undermines the values embodied in the First
Amendment.
It is true that we .have long been surrounded by too much
information, and we have relied on various intermediaries to assist us in
finding and choosing information. Why, then, is the role of selection
intermediaries on the Internet worthy of comment? In my view, the
Internet offers an opportunity for us to craft new approaches to the
selection intermediary function in a way that enables us to keep as much
of the speech freedom engendered by the Internet as possible. There is a
danger that by reflexively drawing analogies to familiar old selection
intermediaries, such as libraries or bookstores, we will settle for the
imposition of selection criteria that erode the freedom of speech made
possible on the Internet.
This Article draws its inspiration from Professor Barron's article,
suggesting that, in the age of the Internet, a complete First Amendment
theory must explicitly address the effects of selection intermediaries and
recognize as protected each of the steps involved in the communicative
relationship between speaker and listener. This includes not only the
right to speak and the right to hear, but also the right to reach an
audience free from the influence of extraneous criteria of discrimination
imposed by selection intermediaries. If selection intermediaries block or
discriminate against a speaker on grounds that listeners would not have
selected, that speaker's ability to speak freely has been undermined.
The United States Congress is now contemplating the Global
Online Freedom Act,8 which is aimed at prohibiting cooperation by
United States search engine and online content hosting businesses with
the censorship requirements of foreign governments. I choose to discuss

8. H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006). This version was replaced on June 22, 2006 by a softened
version during subcommittee deliberations. See Markup Before the Subcomm. on Aft., Global
Human Rights, and Int'l Operations of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations of H. Res. 860, H.R. 4319,
H.R. 4780 and H.R. 5382, 109th Cong., H.R. REP. No. 109-173, at 80 (2006); see also discussion
infra Part V.
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it at the end of this Article in order to explore further the legal
implications of understanding the right of free speech as including a
right to reach an audience. At first glance, this bill looks like a suspect
attempt to apply American law extraterritorially. At second glance,
however, could the blocking of United States content be said to have
"effects" within the United States?9 An understanding of a speaker's
right of free speech as including a right to reach a willing audience
suggests that foreign filtering has effects on the free speech rights of
Americans residing in the United States. Although I doubt the wisdom
of the initial version of the Global Online Freedom Act, it does offer a
useful opportunity to test the possible legal effects of the recognition of
a right to reach an audience.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part II will make a case for the
recognition within the right to free speech of a right to reach an
audience. Part III will illustrate the ways in which selection
intermediaries are undermining speakers' ability to reach an audience.
The selection intermediaries upon which I focus in Part III are primarily
search engines and ISPs, although other intermediaries such as software
filters, spain blocklists, and others could be included here as well. Part
IV will consider whether regulations to address these problems would be
vulnerable to the charge that they violate selection intermediaries' own
First Amendment rights. Part v. will explore the Global Online Freedom
Act and whether its jurisdictional legitimacy is enhanced by viewing free
speech as including a right to reach an audience.
II.

A RIGHT TO REACH AN AUDIENCE?

The right to free speech has traditionally been understood as a
negative right held by speakers. In other words, speakers are protected
from state censorship by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech. The traditional understanding of the right as a negative right,1 °
rather than a positive right (which would require the government to
ensure that citizens have an effective ability to speak), has not changed
even though most people recognize that handing out handbills and

9. With respect to websites providing services, another argument against filtering may be
based on international trade law. See Tim Wu, The World Trade Law of Censorship and Internet
Filtering, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 263, 263 (2006) (investigating Internet filtering under the rules of the
Worll Trade Organization).
10. See MOON, supra note 4, at 7.
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soapbox oratory are no longer socially or politically meaningful ways to
speak in a large and diverse society."
However, the courts have recognized in a variety of contexts that a
right to free speech is not held just by speakers. Listeners, too, have 1a3
12
First Amendment right to receive speech. In Griswold v. Connecticut,
the Supreme Court suggested that the specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have "penumbras" of associated rights that are "formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."' 14 Although the case turned on the penumbral right of
privacy, the Court made statements in passing about the right to receive
information:
[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First
Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right
of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to
print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read
and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to
Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be
teach ....
less secure.15
If the right to free speech is made up of a range of "corollary,"
"penumbral," or "peripheral" rights beyond simply "the right to utter or
to print," what is the best way to understand the full content of the right
to free speech? Clues may be drawn from the theoretical justifications
for the right of free speech as well as from an examination of the nature
of communication itself. The understanding of speech as a

11. Justice Kennedy wrote:
Minds are not changed in streets and parks as they once were. To an increasing degree,
the more significant interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in
mass and electronic media. The extent of public entitlement to participate in those means
of communication may be changed as technologies change.
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802-03 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). As Moon points out, one might add that those still operating in the
streets and parks are more apt to be regarded as "cranks" to be avoided now that the expectation is
that important issues and opinions will be aired in the mass media. See MOON, supra note 4, at 171.
Owen Fiss writes that "[t]he problem, however, is that today the street comer has become marginal
to public debate, and the doctrinal edifice [built around the protection of the street comer speaker] is
largely unresponsive to the conditions of modem society." OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 13 (1996).

12. See Jamie Kennedy, The Right to Receive Information: The Current State of the Doctrine
and the Best Application for the Future, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 789, 789-90 (2005); Susan
Nevelow Mart, The Right to Receive Information, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 175, 175 (2003).
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. Id. at 484.
15. Id. at 482-83 (citations omitted).
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communicative relationship between speaker and listener assists in
constructing a more realistic and complete picture of what it is we are
seeking to protect.
Humans are a social species with a highly developed faculty for
communication. Communication itself is a social activity, and speech
has meaning as communication only in a social relationship established
between a speaker and a listener.16 Many of us "speak to ourselves"
sometimes, but we hardly need constitutional protection to do so. What
we mean by freedom of speech is the ability to speak to someone elsein other words, the ability to communicate.
In his philosophy of free speech, Frederick Schauer reviewed the
leading theoretical justifications for free speech, concluding that what
we are getting at by protecting free speech is the communicative aspect
of speech. 17 The "search for the truth" or "marketplace of ideas"
explanation of the right of free speech 18 and the democratic selfgovernance free speech justification 19 are based in part upon the effects
of speech on listeners. As a result, these explanations depend on the
establishment of a communicative relationship between speakers and
listeners, and they ought to justify the protection of all elements of that
relationship.
The argument for free speech that is based on individual autonomy
and self-development 2° also depends upon the unimpeded ability to
communicate both by hearing others and speaking to them. Schauer
notes the long lineage of the idea that communication and personal

16. See MOON, supra note 4, at 22.
17. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 92 (1982).
18. The "search for the truth" theory suggests that the discovery of truth and the progress of
human knowledge are most likely to occur if all opinions can be publicly heard and weighed against
one another in a "marketplace of ideas." These ideas were embodied in different language in the
work of John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 26-33 (The Electric Book Company
2001).

19.

The "democratic self-govemance" justification for freedom of speech, which is closely

associated with Alexander Meiklejohn, holds that the right of free speech is implicit in democratic
self-government, for without this freedom, the citizenry can neither make wise public policy choices
nor control the government. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 93-102 (1948).

20. This variety of justification focuses on the direct value of free speech to the individual,
rather than on its indirect consequences for the listener or society more generally. These
justifications suggest that the denial of free speech violates the inherent autonomy and dignity of the
individual or that freedom of speech is essential for the development of the uniquely human
capacities for thought and reasoning, and the realization of a full life. See MOON, supra note 4, at
19; SCHAUER, supra note 17, at 49.
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relationships are vital aspects of being human, and concludes that if this
is true, the special protection of communication is easily justified. 1
Ultimately, Schauer suggests that the protection of the freedom to
based on individual "selfcommunicate is fundamentally
development., 22 However, is it not too narrow to say that the value of
communication is that it promotes self-development? Communications
which arguably do not greatly develop one's reasoning capacity are still
valuable in that they offer individuals an escape from solitude through
the exchange of meaning within social relationships. The creation of
meaning is a social process, and communication is a social activity in
which individuals establish and renew relations with others.23
The recognition of the social and' interactive nature of
communication suggests that freedom of speech must necessarily
include each of the steps and elements within the communicative
relationship. In particular, freedom of speech must protect the steps
needed to establish and maintain the communicative relationship. This
must include the ability to hear the communicative overtures launched
by others in the society, as well as the ability to launch one's own
communicative overtures to an audience.
None of this means that a listener must listen, or that a speaker has
a right to the listener's attention. Indeed, the suggestion that a listener is
bound to listen to any speaker ignores the fact that the freedom of both
parties requires that the communicative relationship be voluntary on
both sides.
However, under conditions in which speakers are able to speak in
great and overwhelming numbers, listeners must ignore much of what is
said to them. Listeners will have their own personal criteria for
discrimination among speakers. A speaker can hope-but cannot
demand-that the listener change his reasons for discrimination. Given
the large amount of information, listeners may require assistance in
making their selections, and sometimes a selection intermediary will be
interposed between speaker and listener. That selection intermediary will
21. SCHAUER, supra note 17, at 54 ("The theory that communication and personal
relationships are central features of human development has roots in the writings of Aristotle. If
man is a political and social animal, then communication and the use of language are vital
).
components of humanity ....
22. Id. at 55, 58. Schauer questions why we would protect this aspect of"self-development"
over other needs or desires. Id. at 55. Schauer's concern seems to be to establish a robust right to
free speech that is immune to abridgment by governments in the name of the interests of others.
However, the right of free speech is unlikely to be absolute in this way, and the recognition that it is
a critical value, even if not the critical value, is still of great utility.
23. See MOON, supra note 4, at 21.
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also apply some criteria of discrimination in order to select the speech to
which the listener's attention will be drawn. Where the selection criteria
are those that the listener would have employed, no distortion is thus
introduced by the intermediary. Where the selection intermediary uses
criteria of discrimination that the listener would not have selected, the
selection intermediary is undermining the establishment of a
communicative relationship in a manner that restricts the freedom that
both speaker and listener would otherwise have had.
In light of the potential distortion introduced by selection
intermediaries who use extraneous criteria of discrimination undesired
by listeners, it is perhaps helpful to make explicit a third element within
the right to free speech. One might summarize the necessary components
of a right to free speech as follows:
(1) unimpeded access to the speech of others;
(2) the ability to speak unimpeded by censorship, fear of reprisals,
compulsion to utter certain speech, etcetera (i.e., the conventional
understanding of free speech); and
(3) the unimpeded ability to reach an audience (i.e., the right to be
free of the imposition of discriminatory
filters that the listener
24
would not otherwise have used).
This third element overlaps to some extent with the other two.
However, I think there is value in separating it from the others,
particularly for the purpose of considering the role of selection
intermediaries. The first two elements are more commonly associated
with actions that block communication altogether. The third element
enables a discussion of the effects of selection intermediaries who do not
necessarily block speech, but who select certain speech for preference,
sometimes effectively silencing disfavored speakers.

III.

THE EFFECTS OF SELECTION INTERMEDIARIES ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH

In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,2 5 the Supreme Court
spoke glowingly of the Internet, referring to it as a "vast democratic
for[um], 26 and an exploding "new marketplace of ideas. ' 7 It also noted

24.
speakers
25.
26.
27.

This could be articulated from the listener's perspective as a right to discriminate among
using one's own criteria of discrimination rather than those imposed by another.
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Id. at 868.
Id. at 885.
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that the Internet offers "relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for
communication of all kinds,, 28 dramatically facilitating individual access
to a powerful means of mass speech. Indeed, the Internet's capacity to
permit "individuals to be creators of content rather than just passive
recipients, and active participants in dialogue instead of just
bystanders ' 29 has been welcomed for its democratizing potential. As a
result, the average individual is now able to speak using a medium of
mass communication, and also benefits as a listener from a much greater
degree of autonomy in the choice of information.
Ironically, in proportion to its success in enabling speech, the
Internet decreases the likelihood that any individual speaker will be
found in the resulting "information glut."'30 From the speaker's
perspective, while the Internet may have solved the problem of access to
a means of mass speech, it has exacerbated the new challenge of
reaching a receptive audience.3 1
From the listener's perspective, one has more choice of speakers,
but the Internet, with its billions of webpages, has complicated the task
of selecting among them. In response to the listener's problem, new
forms of selection intermediaries have arisen. An obvious example is the
search engine, which assists not only in finding information, but also in
utility, as
discriminating among speakers according to their quality and
32
expressed in the ordering of webpages in the search results.
We have long been surrounded by too much information, and have
had to rely on a variety of information intermediaries to assist us in
finding and selecting what we want. For example, in the past, publishers,
bookstores, and libraries selected which authors would be able to reach
an audience. Similarly, journalists and the media have selected which
news stories and newsmakers will reach an audience. One might
legitimately ask why the existence of novel intermediaries is worthy of
comment now. I think it is important because a large part of the initial
excitement over the Internet was that it permitted speakers to get around
the traditional intermediaries, which had, particularly in the case of the
media, come under criticism for their selection criteria. We have an
opportunity with these novel information intermediaries to craft new
approaches to the intermediary function that enable us to keep as much

28. Id. at 870.
29. ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION 15 (1999).
30.

See DAVID SHENK, DATA SMOG: SURVIVING THE INFORMATION GLUT 102 (1997).

31.
32.

Id.
See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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of the Internet's free speech benefits as possible in a context where we
are hopefully not bound by "the way it has always been."
An illustration of the importance of revisiting the selection
intermediary's role in the Internet context is illustrated by the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. American Library Association,
Inc.,33 which dealt with the constitutionality of legislation that made
certain funding for libraries contingent on the installation of Internet
filtering software on library computers. Chief Justice Rehnquist treated
as equivalent the selection of printed materials and the selection (by
filter) of Internet materials, noting that the Internet "is 'no more than a
technological extension of the book stack."' 34 Accordingly, he reasoned
that libraries have the same discretion to select materials on the Internet
as they do for their print collections.35 However, this analysis misses the
important advance in information access that the Internet has brought
about. The Internet makes possible access to an enormous quantity of
information, without the constraints that apply to the selection of print
materials (i.e., space and money). The "default" position of the Internet
is comprehensive access, and so the appropriate analogy for the Court's
reasoning was not the process of selecting print materials for inclusion in
a collection, but the decision to remove materials from the collection.36
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion makes this point clearly:
In the instance of the Internet, what the library acquires is electronic
access, and the choice to block is a choice to limit access that has
already been acquired.... The proper analogy therefore is not to
passing up a book that might have been bought; it is either to buying a
book and then keeping it from adults lacking an acceptable "purpose,"
or to buying an encyclopedia and then37cutting out pages with anything
thought to be unsuitable for all adults.
The key opportunity presented by the Internet is unfiltered and
essentially unbiased access to a vast quantity of speech. This is the
"default" position. To the extent that selection intermediaries undermine
this access by imposing criteria of discrimination that listeners would
not choose, they undermine the free speech benefits of the Internet. The
fact that we accepted such discrimination by selection intermediaries in

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

539 U.S. 194 (2003).
Id. at 207 (quoting S. REP. No. 106-141, at 7 (1999)).
Id. at 208.
See the discussion in Kennedy, supra note 12, at 813-18.
Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 237 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the past, or that we accept it for other media, does not mean that we must
do so for the Internet.
What then are the novel selection intermediaries in the Internet
context? The list includes entities designed to locate and recommend
certain information online, including search engines and directories. It
also includes entities and software programs designed to locate and
exclude certain information, such as filtering software or spam
blocklists.38 One could also add software programs such as virus
scanning software which also identify and exclude certain information.
In addition, a debate over "network neutrality" has been raging over the
last year since certain network operators suggested that they would like
to offer preferential delivery of the content of paying speakers online.
This would introduce another form of selection and preference in the
flow of information online.
A. Search Engines and Free Speech
Search engines now occupy a position of central importance on the
Internet. They are used by more than eighty percent of American web
users, 39 and the major search engines, Google and Yahoo!, ranked as the
second and third most used websites in January 2007.40 The rise in the
importance of search engines in online communications is reflected in
the quickening pace of litigation involving them.4 1 The early cases
involved disputes between businesses over the use of a competitor's

38. A spam "blocklist" is a list of known sources of spam which can be queried by mail
servers in order to decide whether to accept a message or not. See Spamhaus, Understanding
DNSBL Filtering, http://www.spamhaus.org/dnsbl-function.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). For a
discussion of the legal issues surrounding spam filters and blocklists, see Jonathan 1. Ezor, Busting
Blocks: Appropriate Legal Remedies for Wrongful Inclusion in Spam Filters Under U.S. Law,
(Touro Coll. Law Ctr. Inst. for Bus. Law & Tech., Working Paper Series, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=94455 1.
39. Memorandum from Deborah Fallows, PIP Senior Research Fellow, Lee Rainie, Director,
& Graham Mudd, comScore Senior Analyst, Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, on The Popularity
and Importance of Search Engines (Aug. 2004), http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPData_
MemoSearchengines.pdf.
40. Nielsen NetRatings makes some statistics publicly available on its website, including lists
of the top ten websites on a monthly and weekly basis for both home use and work use. For January
2007, Google and Yahoo! were in second and third position for both work and home use. See
Nielsen/NetRatings, Global Index Chart, http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/resources.jsp?section =
pr-netv&nav=1 (follow "United States" hyperlink; then follow "Home Panel: Monthly Top 10
Parent Companies" and "Work Panel: Monthly Top 10 Parent Companies" hyperlinks) (last visited
Mar. 3, 2007).
41. For a good history of search engine litigation, see Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines:
Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 201, 208-16 (2006).
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trademark within the "meta tags" on a business' website.42 Since then,
there have been a growing number of disputes over unstated commercial
bias in search engine results, ranking demotions within search engine
results, and the removal of websites altogether from search engine
indices or search results.
The importance of search engines is also reflected in the energy that
webmasters put into ensuring that they are included in search engine
indices and in attempting to improve their ranking within search results.
These efforts may legitimately flow from a sophisticated understanding
of how search engines work, but other techniques may fairly be
characterized as abusive.4 3 Those practices considered abusive are
sometimes known as "spamdexing" or "search engine spamming" and
involve a range of practices designed to fool or manipulate search
engines into placing a website in the top search results.4 4
In one of the key early papers on the socio-political impact of
search engines, Lucas Introna and Helen Nissenbaum observed that
45
inclusion in search engine indices is critical to being found online.
Even though there are other means of reaching websites, such as
following links or guessing at URLs, search engines are the most
prominent.46 Not only is it important for a website to be included within
a search engine, but its ranking within search engine results will also
determine whether it is visible to searchers. The phenomenon of "screen
bias," (or the preference for results listed in the first screen of search

42. See id. at 209-10. Meta tags are information included in the code for a website that is not
visible to the viewer but used to be used by search engines in identifying the content of the website.
See Danny Sullivan, How to Use HTML Meta Tags, SEARCHENGINEWATCH, Dec. 5,
2002,http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage.html?page=2167931.
43. See Andrew Goodman, Search Engine Showdown. Black Hats v. White Hats at SES,
SEARCHENGINEWATCH,
Feb. 17, 2005, http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage.html?page=
3483941.
44. For an overview of practices that are problematic, see Marziah Karch, Top 10 Google
Dont's-Things You Should Never Do for Search Engine Optimization, ABOUT,
http://google.about.com/od/searchengineoptimization/tp/badseo.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). This
topic has produced an academic subfield known as Adversarial Information Retrieval. See AIRWeb,
Adversarial Information Retrieval on the Web, http://airweb.cse.lehigh.edu/ (describing the annual
workshops put on by an organization called Adversarial Information Retrieval on the Web) (last
visited Mar. 3, 2007).
45. Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 7, at 54; see also Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias
and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 189 (2006) (noting that
search engines wield "significant power to shape searcher behavior and perceptions ...[and] the
choices that search engines make about how to collect and present data can have significant social
implications").
46. Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 7, at 54.
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results) is familiar from the 47 conflict over airline computerized
reservation systems in the 1980S.
From the perspective of searchers, too, the value of search engines
lies not only in gathering information about the information available on
the Web, but also in ranking it according to its quality or relevancy to
the search query. As of November, 2004, Google reported its index to
contain more than eight billion pages.4 8 To put this in perspective, one
would have to read almost 440,000 pages per day, every day, for fifty
years in order to review Google's index. An essential element of search
engine utility is thus the ranking of websites in response to search
queries.
In short, the ability of a speaker to reach an audience online is
greatly affected by the inclusion of the speaker's website in search
engine indices, as well as the website's ranking within search results.
The policies of search engines with respect to inclusion and ranking thus
become important to the free speech of both speakers and listeners
online.
Certain forms of bias seem inherent in the structure of the Web. To
the extent that search engines build their indices using automated
49
software agents ("bots") which follow hyperlinks between websites,
and search engines use the number of links to a site as a proxy for its
quality, 50 the link structure of the Web may favour popular and highly-

47. See, e.g., Pam Fair, Anti-Competitive Aspects of Airline Ownership of Computerized
Reservation Systems, 17 TRANSP. L.J. 321, 333 (1989); see also Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note
7, at 56 ("[A]necdotal evidence suggests that seekers are likely to look down a list, then cease
looking when they find a good match for their search. A study of travel agents who use
computerized airline reservations systems showed an overwhelming likelihood that they would
select a flight from the first screen of search results. Such findings suggest similar behavior among
Web users at large.").
48. Google Corporate Information, Google Milestones, www.google.com/corporate/
timeline.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2007); Danny Sullivan, New Estimate Puts Web Size at 11.5
Billion Pages & Compares Search Engine Coverage, SEARCHENGINEWATCH, May 17, 2005,
http://blog.searchenginewatch.com/blog/050517-075657. Prior to 2004, Yahoo! did not report its
index size, but in August 2005, it claimed over 19 billion Web documents. Danny Sullivan, The End
of the Size Wars? Part I, CLICKZ NETWORK, Oct. 5, 2005, www.clickz.com/showPage.html?
page=3553266.
49. Google writes: "Links help our crawlers find your site and can give your site greater
visibility in our search results." Google Webmaster Help Center, How Can I Create a Googlefriendly Site?, www.google.com/support/webmasters/binanswer.py?answer-40349&topic=8522
(last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
50. Google informs webmasters that "Google counts the number of votes a page receives as
part of its PageRank assessment, interpreting a link from page A to page B as a vote by page A for
page B. Votes cast by pages that are themselves 'important' weigh more heavily and help to make
other pages 'important."' Id.
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linked sites. This popularity-based ranking system produces a bias
toward majoritarian interests and sites with the economic resources to
purchase advertising.51
Nevertheless, debate has arisen over additional forms of bias
introduced by search engines, including (1) the removal of websites
from the search engine index, (2) the reduction of website ranking,
(3) the refusal to accept keyword-triggered advertisements from certain
websites, and (4) the practice of providing preferences in indexing or
ranking for paying websites. Each of these will be briefly outlined
below.
B. Removal of Websitesfrom the Search Engine Index
On occasion, search engines remove websites from their indices.
Google has indicated that it does so only when legally compelled or
52
when a webmaster has attempted to manipulate its search results.
Google has removed a website containing allegedly copyright-infringing
material in response to a takedown demand from the Church of
Scientology under § 512(c)(3) of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act. 53 A search in Google for "xenu.net" (the site involved in the
dispute) produced a result page on which Google has posted a notice
which states, "[i]n response to a complaint we received under the US
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, we have removed 1 result(s) from
the DMCA complaint that caused
this page. If you wish, you may read ' 54
the removal(s) at ChillingEffects.org.
Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman have also described the
removal of white supremacist material from the German and French
versions of Google.55 Google includes notifications in German and
French, respectively, of the removal of results and directs searchers to

51. Goldman, supra note 45.
52. In response to a petition to remove an anti-Semitic website that had reached the first
position in the search results for a search using the keyword "Jew," Google explained that the only
sites it omits are those that it is "legally compelled to remove or those maliciously attempting to
Results,
Search
of Our
An
Explanation
Google,
results."
[its]
manipulate
www.google.com/explanation.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
53. Matt Loney, Cult Forces Google to Remove Critical Links, ZDNET UK, Mar. 21, 2002,
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/intemet/0, 1000000097,2107088,00.htm.
54. See David F. Gallagher, New Economy; A Copyright Dispute With the Church of
Scientology is Forcing Google to Do Some Creative Linking, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2002, at C4.
Google directed interested users to Scientology's complaint on chillingeffects.org. Id.
55. Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Localized Google Search Result Exclusions:
Statement of Issues and Call for Data, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY, HARVARD

LAW SCHOOL, Oct. 26, 2002, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/google/.
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ChillingEffects.org.5 6 Alta Vista and Google have also removed links to
a website containing information on how to sabotage railway systems
57
after the Deutsche Bahn threatened to sue them if they did not do so.
C. Reduction of Website Ranking
Google assigns a ranking to websites, known as PageRank. The
ranking is one of the factors that is used in determining a website's
placement within the search engine results. Consequently, PageRank is
an important attribute, and sudden drops in rating have produced great
unhappiness among webmasters. Sometimes, the reason for the drop is
unclear. However, on occasion the demotions appear to be a response by
Google to a website's abusive attempts to manipulate the search engine
results.58 Google warns webmasters that they should not engage in
"illicit practices," which will result in penalties. 59 The Webmaster
Guidelines list certain specific practices, but note that Google may
punish other misleading practices that are not listed. 60 Google provides a
mechanism for webmasters to request re-inclusion of their sites.6 1
In February 2006, Google announced that it would remove the
websites of BMW Germany and Ricoh Germany from its index because
they had used banned methods to manipulate the search engine. 62 There
have also been at least four lawsuits over ranking demotions. 63 At least

56. A search on www.google.fr for one of the sites tested by Zittrain and Edelman
(site:stormfront.org) produces the following notice indicating that 2004 results have been removed,
and directing the searcher to ChillingEffects.org: "En r6ponse A une demande 16gale adress~e A
Google, nous avons retir6 2004 r6sultat(s) de cette page. Si vous souhaitez en savoir plus sur cette
demande, vous pouvez consulter le site ChillingEffects.org." http://www.google.fr/search?hl=fr&q=
site%3Astormfront.org&btnG=Rechercher&meta=lr%/o3D.
57. Joris Evers, AltaVista, Google Remove ControversialLinks, PC WORLD, Apr. 18, 2002,
www.pcworld.com/article/id,94843 -page, I/article.html.
58. See, e.g.,
Help, My Site Has Been Banned by
Google!, PANDIA,
www.pandia.com/features/banned.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
59. Google Webmaster Help Center, Webmaster Guidelines, www.google.com/support/
webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer-35769 (last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
60. Id.
61. Google Webmaster Help Center, How Do I Request Reinclusion of My Site?,
www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer=35843 (last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
62. See Matt Cutts: Gadgets, Google, and SEO, Ramping Up on International Webspam,
www.mattcutts.com/blog/ramping-up-on-international-websparr/ (Feb. 4, 2006, 16:44 EST).
63. See, e.g., Kinderstart.com.LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2006 WL
3246596, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006); Roberts v. Google, Inc., No. 1-06-CV-063047 (Cal.
Super. Ct. May 12, 2006), reportedin Eric Goldman: Technology and Marketing Law Blog, Google
Avoids
Another
Lawsuit
Over
Rankings
(For
Now)-Roberts
v.
Google,
www.blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/06/google-avoids-a.htm (June 5, 2006, 11:00 EST);
Datner v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. BC355217 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 11, 2006), reported in Eric Goldman:
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one of the demotions appears to have resulted from practices contrary to
Google's Webmaster Guidelines. Search King, Inc. v. Google
Technology, Inc.6 4 dealt with a dispute over Google's ranking demotion
of the plaintiffs website. Search King offered a match-making service
designed to assist clients to buy and sell links from highly ranked
websites in the hope of increasing the ranking of the linked-to
websites. 65 Google admitted that it had deliberately decreased the
ranking of the Search King websites, stating that it was entitled to do so
because Search King's actions undermined the integrity of its PageRank
system. 66 Search King, on the other hand, argued that Google had
demoted its websites because it was competing with Google, and sued
for tortious interference with contractual relations.67
D. Refusal to Accept Keyword-TriggeredAdvertisements
68
Advertising is now a major revenue stream for search engines.
Low-ranked websites also find the purchase of spots in the sponsored
listings to be a useful means of gaining public exposure.
Google offers two advertising programs: AdSense and AdWords.
AdWords is a keyword-based advertising service in which
advertisements are placed next to the search results generated for a
particular keyword. 69 Google is about to start offering site-based
advertising services in which advertisers may pay to have their

Technology and Marketing Law Blog, Another Day, Another Lawsuit Over Search Engine
Placement-Datner v. Yahoo, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/07/anotherday-ano.htm
(July 14, 2006, 9:36 EST); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, at *2-3
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 13, 2003) (order denying plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction); Search
King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27,
2003).
64. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. Jan.
13, 2003) (order denying plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction); Search King, Inc. v. Google
Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
65. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. Jan.
13, 2003) (order denying plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction); see also Danny Sullivan,
4,
2002,
Nov.
Over PageRank Decrease, SEARCHENGINEWATCH,
Google Sued
http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage.html?page=2165111.
66.
Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 13,
2003) (order denying plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction).
67. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *2
(W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
68. According to Google's latest quarterly earnings report, about ninety-nine percent of its
revenues are derived from advertising. See Press Release, Google Investor Relations, Financial
Release: Google Announces Third Quarter 2006 Results (Oct. 19, 2006), http://investor.google.com/
releases/2006Q3.html.
69. Google AdWords, https://adwords.google.com/select/Login (last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
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advertisements placed on certain sites within the Google content
network.7 ° AdSense is a program in which website publishers may sign
up to carry Google-delivered advertising on their websites. 7 1 Website
publishers are assured that they may filter out certain kinds of
advertisements (including the ads of competitors, or "death/chaos/war
ads") and that Google editors pre-approve ads to remove content such as
"adult" material.72
Several disputes have arisen over search engine refusals to include
advertisements. In Langdon v. Google, Inc., 73 the plaintiff complained
that Google would not let him purchase ads to advertise his websites,
which
criticized
the
North
Carolina
Attorney
General
(www.ncjusticefraud.com)
and
the
Chinese
government
(www.chinaisevil.com).

74

Google

refused

his

anti-North

Carolina

Attorney General ad, citing its policy against advertisements that
"advocate against an individual, group or organization., 75 Google failed
to issue any decision regarding the plaintiffs short anti-China
76
advertisement, which linked to his website www.chinaisevil.com.
Dawn Nunziato cites several more examples, including Google's
suspension of ads for a political site that promoted the owner's book,
Basic Documents About the Detainees at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib,
on the ground that Google policy does not permit advertisement of
websites containing "sensitive issues. 7 7 She also cites Google's
suspension of ads for a website that contained an article criticizing
President Bush on the ground that ads advocating against an individual
violate its policy.78 Nunziato recounts the case of an attempt to advertise

70. Google AdWords, All About Site-Targeted Ads, www.google.com/ads/sitetargeted.html
(last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
71. Google
AdSense,
Discover
Your
Site's
Full
Revenue
Potential,
www.google.com/adsense/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
72. Google AdSense, Show Only Appropriate Ads, www.google.com/services/adsense-tour/
page7.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
73. Complaint at 1,Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007).
74. See Posting of Ryan Singel & Kevin Poulsen to Wired Blogs, http://blog.wired.com/
27bstroke6/2006/06/google..sued for.html?entry-id=1497511 (June 7, 2006, 22:27 EST); Eric
Goldman: Technology and Marketing Law Blog, "Must Carry" Lawsuit Against Search EnginesLangdon v. Google, http://www.blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/06/must-carry-laws.htm (June
8, 2006 12:46 EST). Chris Langdon explains his complaints on his website at
www.chinaisevil.com/googlegagarchipelago.html.
75. See Posting of Ryan Singel & Kevin Poulsen to Wired Blogs, supra note 74.
76. Id. The text of the ad read "Communist China Has Murdered Millions: Boycott China."
Id.
77. Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1115, 1124 (2005).
78. Id.
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anti-Iraq War bumper stickers with a headline "Who Would Jesus
Bomb? ' 79 Initially, Google refused to run the ad, but agreed to reinstate
it if the website was edited "'to show both sides of the argument' over
attacking Iraq.",80 After a long and interesting exchange of emails in
which the advertiser and Google's ad reviewing team discussed the
matter, Google eventually agreed to run the ad.81
E. Preferential Treatment in Indexing and Search Results
In 2001, the consumer advocacy group Commercial Alert sent a
request to the Federal Trade Commission asking that it investigate
certain search engines for violations of § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act,82 due to the practices of paid placement (payment for
higher placement in search engine results) and paid inclusion (payment
for inclusion in an index, speedier inclusion in an index, more frequent
updating within the index, or the inclusion of more sub-pages in an
index).83 The practice of paid placement would clearly introduce a
significant commercial bias that would likely be inconsistent to some
degree with a ranking based on quality or relevancy. The effects of paid
inclusion are more subtle. Paid inclusion does not guarantee a particular
placement in search results, but it does help a website ensure that it is
included in the index quickly and comprehensively, while non-paying
websites do not have this advantage.
The FTC declined to investigate, but did send a letter to the search
engines encouraging them to ensure that (1) "any paid ranking search
results are distinguished from non-paid results with clear and
conspicuous disclosures," (2) "the use of paid inclusion is clearly and
conspicuously explained and disclosed," and (3) "no affirmative
statement is made that might mislead consumers as to the basis on which
a search result is generated., 84 In addition, search engines were
encouraged to communicate with third parties to whom they supply

79. Id. at 1124 n.28.
80. Id.
81. See Unknown News, Google Refuses Our Ad, www.unknownnews.net/google.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2007).
82.

15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000 & Supp. I1 2005).

83. Letter from Gary Ruskin, Executive Dir., Commercial Alert, to Donald Clark, Sec'y of
the Comm'n, Fed. Trade Comm'n (July 16, 2001), available at http://www.commercialalert.org/
PDFs/SearchEngines.pdf.
84. Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir., Div. of Adver. Practices, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, to Gary Ruskin, Executive Dir., Commercial Alert (June 27, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commericalalertletter.htm.
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search results to ensure that appropriate disclosures are made on the
third party sites as well.85
At present, Google clearly separates "sponsored links" in a column
on one side of the search results page. Google does not offer paid
inclusion, and it invites anyone to submit a link to a website without
guaranteeing inclusion.8 6 Yahoo! runs a column of "sponsor results" on
one side of its search results page. In addition, the first couple of results
under the heading of "search results" are identified (far to the right of the
frame) as "sponsor results." Above the unpaid search results, Yahoo!
also offers a "Yahoo! Shortcut" which may also include sponsored
material.8 7 Another band of sponsor results and Yahoo! shortcuts are
included below the unpaid results. As a result of all of this advertising, a
typical Yahoo! search results page for a query that would be of
commercial interest contains more advertising results than unpaid
results.88 Yahoo! also suggests alternate search terms that may include
the names of commercial entities.89 Yahoo! invites anyone to submit a
URL for inclusion in its index, but it also runs a paid inclusion system
which offers customers guaranteed inclusion as well as the refreshment
of their website in the index every forty-eight hours. 90 Yahoo! also
charges a fee for inclusion in its Directory. 91
A 2005 Pew survey examined user expectations in relation to
search engine results. 92 The survey found that only thirty-eight percent
of users were aware of the difference between paid (or "sponsored")

85. Id.
86. Google, Add Your URL to Google, www.google.com/addurl/?continue=/addurl (last
visited Mar. 4, 2007).
87. Yahoo! provides the following explanation: "A Yahoo! Shortcut is a quick way to get to
the information you want. A Yahoo! Shortcut automatically appears when it is relevant to your
search and can contain links to useful content from Yahoo!, its partners, or across the web. Some of
the content may come from partners who pay to be included in Yahoo! or have another financial
relationship with Yahoo!." Yahoo!, Yahoo! Shortcuts, http://tools.search.yahoo.com/shortcuts/ (last
visited Mar. 4, 2007).
88. For example, I ran a search for "books," which produced ten unpaid results, fourteen
sponsored links, and two batches of Yahoo! Shortcuts (containing six links). Yahoo! also suggested
alternate terms that included Amazon (three times) as well as other booksellers. A similar pattern
existed for the search term "computers."
89. Id.
90. Yahoo!, Yahoo!search: Submit Your Site, http://search.yahoo.com/info/submit.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2007).
91. Yahoo!, Yahoo! Directory Listings, https://ecom.yahoo.com/dir/submit/intro/ (last visited
Mar. 8, 2007).
92. Press Release, Pew Internet & American Life Project, Internet Users Are Very Happy
with Their Experiences Searching the Internet, but Many Are Naive About How They Search and
the Results They Find (Jan. 23, 2005), www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/96/press-release.asp.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss3/6

20

Chandler: A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on
A RIGHT TO REACH AN AUDIENCE

2007]

results and unpaid results, and only one in six said they could always tell
which results were sponsored and which were not.93 This is quite
troubling from the free speech perspective, as it raises questions about
whether users are aware of the commercial bias introduced through
search engines. To the extent that users would not have filtered their
information in a similar manner, these practices introduce extraneous
considerations and interests in a way that undermines the
communication of information between speakers and listeners online. As
discussed further below, the solution may not be to stop these practices,
particularly since the search engines derive a significant portion of their
revenue from this type of advertising. However, it does suggest that
greater efforts may be required to clearly identify advertising and to
clearly inform users of how the indices and directories are populated.
F. Recommendations
Several authors have noted the problem of bias in search engines,
although they differ widely in their recommended solutions. 94 Several
have called for a transparency requirement to be imposed on search
engines. This transparency requirement should include (a) disclosure of
the way in which the search engines work and how they rank search
results,

95

(b) clear identification of paid links, 96 and (c) notification when

information is blocked or removed pursuant to law. 97 In addition, Introna
and Nissenbaum call for the development of a publicly-supported search
engine in order to increase transparency and access. 98 Another
suggestion is that the search engines establish ombudsmen to address the
concerns of webmasters who feel that they have been unfairly treated. 99

93.

Id.

94. A selection of recent papers includes Gasser, supra note 41 (advocating a complete
assessment of alternative regulatory approaches prior to deciding legislative intervention is the best

solution); Goldman, supra note 45 (arguing that search engine bias is necessary and desirable, and
that regulatory intervention is unwarranted); Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and
Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 115, 135-39 (2006) (proposing legal remedies for harms
claimed to flow from unwanted inclusion or exclusion in search engine results); Andrew Sinclair,
Note, Regulation of Paid Listings in Internet Search Engines: A Proposal for FTC Action, 10 B.U.
J. Sci. & TECH. L. 353, 364-66 (2004) (advocating, among other things, FTC action against search
engines that use paid listings without disclosing this fact to consumers).
95. Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 7, at 61; Gasser, supra note 41, at 232-34.
96. Gasser, supra note 41, at 233. But see Sinclair, supra note 94, at 372.
97.
98.

Gasser, supra note 41, at 233-34.
See Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 7, at 61.
Posting of Danny Sullivan to SEARCHENGINEWATCH, http://blog.searchenginewatch.com/

99.
blog/060706-075235 (July 6, 2006).
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Frank Pasquale also suggests that webmasters should have some
opportunity to know the reasons for rank demotions.' 00
Eric Goldman, on the other hand, is less concerned. He suggests
that market forces will satisfactorily limit the scope of bias.' 0 ' In his

view, search engines that deliver heavily commercial or irrelevant
information will be dropped by users, who will switch to competing
search engines. 0 2 This is likely true to some extent, but there are reasons
to remain watchful. First, it is not clear that users will be able to monitor
effectively for other kinds of bias, such as deletions from the index or
manipulations of ranking. Commercial bias is more visible than the
removal of websites or the manipulation of search results that causes
disfavored websites to appear far down the results list. Second, the
search engine space is quite concentrated. There are four major players
who produce their own independent indices, and together they accounted
for about ninety-seven percent of the United States search market share
in the spring of 2006, with Google and Yahoo! representing seventyeight percent of the market.10 3 It may be that the resources required to
launch an independent, similarly comprehensive
search index have
04
entry.1
to
barrier
significant
a
become
Goldman also predicts that emerging technologies will resolve any
concerns regarding bias.10 5 In particular, he sees hope in the possibility
of personalized search engines. Personalized systems would alleviate the
consequences of the current system, which, in his view, creates highly
ranked winners and invisible losers and satisfies majoritarian but not
minority interests. 0 6 There are movements toward customized search

100. Pasquale, supra note 94, at 137-38.
101.

Goldman, supra note 45, at 196.

102. Id. at 196-97.
103.

Economist reports the following market shares for April 2006: Google (and AOL, which

is powered by Google), fifty percent; Yahoo!, twenty-eight percent; MSN, thirteen percent; and
Ask.com, six percent. Internet Search Engines: The un-Google, ECONOMIST, June 17, 2006, at 65;

see also Bruce Clay, Inc., Search Engine Relationship Chart, www.bruceclay.com/
searchenginechart.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2007) (illustrating that of the major search engines, only
Google, Yahoo!, Ask.com, and MSN produce their own spider-based indices).
104. See Internet Search Engines, supra note 103, at 65 ("[B]ecause barriers to entry in the

search business are high-the engineering talent is limited and data centres that can simultaneously
support millions of searches are expensive-most analysts think that the four big search engines
will stay ahead of the tiny ones."); see also Susan Kuchinskas, Peeking Into Google,
INTERNETNEWS.COM,
Mar. 2, 2005,
http://www.internetnews.com/xSP/article.php/3487041
(explaining that Google deals with more than ten billion web pages and ten terabytes of information

in a way that makes it both reliable and rapid).
105.

Goldman, supra note 45, at 198-99.

106.

Id. at 198.
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engines among the leading search engines. Both Yahoo! and Google
now offer customized services that allow users to specify which sites are
to be included and excluded from a personalized index, or which will
receive highest priority. 107
From the free speech perspective adopted in this Article, the
appropriate solution is one that respects a speaker's right to reach an
audience, and the listener's right to choose among speakers according to
the listener's own criteria, free of extraneous discriminatory influences.
The following requirements would help to address the problems
discussed above in a way that protects to the extent possible these free
speech interests.
First, search engines should not remove websites from their indices
unless required by law to do so. The removal of any website and the
reason for the removal should be made known within a publiclyaccessible list. Although Google's present practice of notifying searchers
who search specifically for a website that pages have been removed
from the search results is an excellent start, users who are searching
more generally for information within which the website would have
appeared might never know of its removal. The creation of a centralized
list of deletions would strike a compromise between addressing the
illegality of the website by withdrawing the assistance of the search
engine, while not misleading users as to the comprehensiveness and
neutrality of the search engine.
Second, search engines should make clear the nature of their
indexing and search result ranking criteria. They cannot make the exact
details known, as this would invite too much "gaming" of the system by
unscrupulous webmasters, but search engines should adhere strictly to
their publicized indexing and search result ranking practices.
Third, search engines should not manipulate individual search
results except to address instances of suspected abuse of the system.
Where this is found to have occurred, notification of the nature of the
offense and of the steps required for reinstatement should be sent
automatically to the offending webmaster.
Fourth, significant efforts should be made to specify which search
results are paid advertisements and which are not. Users should not have
to dig through "about us" pages to find out how commercial bias is
introduced into the system. While Google does a good job of making its
paid results clear, Yahoo!'s approach is far inferior. Most users would

107.

Erica Ogg, Google Releases Customizable Search, CNETNEWS.COM, Oct. 23, 2006,

http://news.com.com/Google+releases+customizable+search/2100-1038_3-6128807.html.
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not know that Yahoo! offers preferential inclusion into its index for a
fee. In addition, they might not know that Yahoo!'s directory listings are
paid for, particularly since a search of directory listings provides a
results page with a column of "sponsor results" on one side (the
misleading implication being that the directory listings are not also paid
listings).
G. Network Operatorsand the "Net Neutrality" Debate
The "network neutrality" debate has been simmering for some time,
but it achieved sudden new prominence in early 2006 when major
network operators began to float the idea of charging content providers
an extra fee for preferential handling of their traffic.10 8 The concept of
"network neutrality" includes a broader set of ways in which a network
operator may discriminate against content providers and applications
traveling over its network. 10 9 One key concern with this type of
discrimination is the potential for anticompetitive behaviour by network
operators (e.g., preferential access only for the operator's own content or
that of its affiliates) as well as the erosion of innovation in network
applications and content production if the network operators are
permitted to choose what to carry." 10
The "network neutrality" debate also has clear implications for free
speech. Some network operators are pushing for a model which may roll
back some of the key benefits of the. Internet for freedom of speech,
namely the rough egalitarianism in access to an effective means of mass
speech for a huge number of speakers. It is true that, even apart from the
practices at the heart of the network neutrality debate, the Internet does
not provide a truly level playing field for all speakers or for all types of
speech. Well-heeled speakers can design more attractive content,
purchase search engine optimization advice or search engine preferences
to make their websites more visible, buy advertising for their sites, and
108. Marguerite Reardon, AT&T Chief FCC ChairClarify on Net Neutrality, CNETNEWS.COM,
Mar. 21, 2006, http://news.com.com/AT38T+chief%2C+FCC+chair+clarify+on+Net+neutrality/
2100-1034_3-6052239.html?tag=nl; Anne Broache, Push for Net Neutrality Mandate Grows,
CNETNEWS.COM, Mar. 17, 2006, http://news.com.com/Push+for+Net+neutrality+mandate+grows/
2100-1028_3-6051062.html.
109. Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 109th
Cong. 28-30 (2006) (statement of Earl W. Comstock, Pres. & CEO, Comptel) [hereinafter Hearing
on Net Neutrality].
110. See Paul Ganley & Ben Allgrove, Net Neutrality: A User's Guide, 22 COMPUTER L. &
SEC. REP. 454, 457 (2006); Hearing on Net Neutrality, supra note 109, at 53-55, 58 (2006)
(statement of Lawrence Lessig, C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Prof. of Law, Stanford Law
School).
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so forth. In addition, they can buy more bandwidth to ensure that that
their speech is easily accessible to listeners, and they can contract with
content hosting services to increase the speed of access to their speech
by making it available at several points throughout the Internet.' ]'
Therefore, some speakers are better able to reach an audience online
even if basic access is within reach of many. In addition to the Internet's
imperfect egalitarianism with respect to access, the technology
inherently discriminates against certain types of applications. The
network's current mode of handling traffic is one of treating all data
packets equally according to "best efforts." Under conditions of
congestion, packets may be delayed or dropped.! 12 Certain types of
applications, such as streaming video, are less tolerant of delay or
dropped packets, and 13so the present system disfavors them when the
network is congested."
Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the Internet does provide a
platform for a remarkable increase in the number of speakers, and a
much greater degree of equality of access than we have had before with
respect to mass communication technologies. As a result, to the extent
that network operators desire to adopt business strategies that will erode
these gains, it is important to consider how this will affect freedom of
speech.
The most obvious free speech problem in terms of discrimination
by network operators arises where they block access to particular
speakers. Unfortunately, examples exist of network operators singling
out speakers for censorship. In 2005, the Canadian ISP Telus blocked
access to a website supporting the company's labour union during a
labour dispute." 14 In the United States, AOL has been accused of
blocking access to communications criticizing its pay-to-email scheme,
although AOL has maintained that the blocking was an inadvertent

111. Ganley & Allgrove, supra note 110, at 457; see also Postings of Christopher S. Yoo &
Timothy Wu to Legal Affairs Debate Club, http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclubnet-neutrality0506.msp (May 1-4, 2006) (debating whether net neutrality will be beneficial or
detrimental to innovation and democracy).
112. See Freedom to Tinker, Nuts and Bolts of Network Discrimination, www.freedom-totinker.com/?p=983 (Mar. 2, 2006, 17:30 EST); Freedom to Tinker, Nuts and Bolts of Network
Discrimination: Part 2, www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=986 (Mar. 7, 2006, 10:54 EST).
113. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination,2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141, 148 (2003).
114. See Telus Cuts Subscriber Access to Pro-union Website, CBC NEWS, July 24, 2005,

www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2005/07/24/telus-sites050724.html.
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malfunction. 15 Clearly, the -ability and demonstrated willingness of
network operators to block speakers offers a serious challenge to free
speech. Network operators have also shown themselves willing to block
access to competing applications. On occasion, telecommunications
service providers have blocked access to voice over Internet protocol
("VOIP") services over their broadband networks, presumably in order
to protect their own voice services from competition. 16 In 2005, the
Federal Communications Commission investigated Madison River
Communications in North Carolina after complaints were made that it
had blocked its broadband Internet subscribers' access to VOIP
service. 11 7 Access was restored after the FCC intervened. The threat in
this case of the blockage of an application like VOIP is to competition
and innovation, rather than necessarily to freedom of speech.
Apart from concerns over blocking, freedom of speech may also be
affected by "access-tiering." Access-tiering refers to a practice of
creating different levels of service quality by discriminating amongst
data packets so that certain packets will receive preferential delivery
over others. 118 Preferential treatment could be given to specific
applications, so that particular kinds of traffic that are sensitive to delay
and dropped packets would be favored. 1 9 It could also be done, as
various network operators have now publicly stated, by offering
120
preferential treatment to the traffic of paying content providers.
Presumably, such a system would work best if it were adopted by
network operators generally. If a transmission must travel across several
networks, the preferential treatment will be most effective 12if1 it is applied
by all of the network operators that carry the transmission.

115. See Stefanie Olsen, AOL Charged With Blocking Opponents' E-mail, CNETNEWS.COM,
Apr. 14, 2006, http://news.com.com/AOL+charged+with+blocking+opponents+e-mail/210010303-6061089.html.
116. See Ben Charny, Mexico Telephone Operator Under VoIP Fire, CNETNEWS.COM, Apr.
25,
2005,
http://news.com.com/Mexico+telephone+operator+under+VoIP+fire/2100-7352_35681542.html.
117. See Declan McCullagh, Telco Agrees to Stop Blocking VOIP Calls, CNETNEWS.COM, Mar.
3,
2005,
http://news.com.com/Telco+agrees+to+stop+blocking+VoIP+calls/2100-7352_35598633.html; In re Madison River Commc'ns, LLC, DA 05-543 (FCC Consent Decree Mar. 3,
2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DA-05-543A2.pdf.
118. See Ganley & Allgrove, supra note 110, at 454-55.
119. Seeid.at457.
120. See Hearingon Net Neutrality, supra note 109, at 28-29 (statement of Earl W. Comstock,
Pres. & CEO, Comptel); Ganley & AlIgrove, supra note 110, at 457; Christopher Stem, The
Coming Tug of War Over the Internet, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2006, at BI.
121. See Hearing on Net Neutrality, supra note 109, at 29 (statement of Earl W. Comstock,
Pres. & CEO, Comptel).
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For obvious reasons, network operators would be pleased to be able
to extract payment from content providers, in addition to relying on fees
from their subscribers. Some network operators claim that they are
justified in seeking fees for tiered access on the ground that major
content providers, such as Google, Yahoo!, or Vonage, are using their
lines "for free. 122 However, both content providers and subscribers pay
for network access, and can hardly be said to be getting carriage
"free.' 23 The difficulty from the perspective of a given network operator
may be that it does not directly receive the funds from the major content
providers. The major content providers may buy their access from
another operator, and their traffic may travel across a variety of carriers'
networks through transit or peering arrangements before it arrives on the
complaining operator's network for delivery to its subscribers. 124 This
does not mean that the Googles and Yahoo!s are using the pipes for free,
but that the current system of transit and peering arrangements between
to permit efficient revenue-sharing
network operators is inadequate
125
between network operators.
Network operators also justify their desire to offer tiered access by
claiming that they need more funds in order to invest in greater network
capacity. 126 This may or may not be true, but it does not necessarily
follow that tiered access is the best way to do it. Network operators can
increase subscription fees, as well as the fees that they charge directly to
content providers who contract with them for bandwidth.
Another argument in favour of tiered access relies upon the need to
provide preferential treatment for applications that are less tolerant of the
delay and packet loss that may occur when networks are congested. Not
everyone feels that the solution to congestion is to provide preferential
delivery for sensitive applications. Gary R. Bachula of Intemet2
bandwidth than to create a
suggests that it is cheaper to build more
27
scheme for variable quality of service. 1
Access-tiering would have harmful effects on freedom of speech. It
provides a greater preference than already exists for wealthy speakers, as
122.
123.
124.

Ganley & Allgrove, supranote 110, at 459.
Id.
Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality or Bias?-Handicapping the Odds for a Tiered and

Branded Internet, 14-20 (Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series, Sept. 2006)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=893649.
125. Id. at 20-22 (discussing peering and transiting relationships, noting that they are difficult
to study because they normally are covered by comprehensive nondisclosure agreements).
126. Ganley & Allgrove, supra note 110, at 459.
127. See Hearing on Net Neutrality, supra note 109, at 66 (statement of Gary R. Bachula, Vice
Pres., External Affairs, lnternet2).
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the preferential carriage granted to their speech may make it increasingly
easy to access in comparison with others. To the extent that network
operators dedicate much of their capacity for preferred access (for their
own speech, their affiliates' speech, or the speech of paying content
providers), the speech of others will have to share a smaller portion of
bandwidth. One assumes that, unless network capacity is increased, this
would mean that during times of congestion, users will find it more
difficult than
it is at present to access the speech of these other
28
speakers. 1

If a network operator starts to give preference to packets from one
source (that perhaps pays the operator for preference), what happens to
all of the other, ordinary packets? We know that when an ambulance or
fire truck comes down a congested highway, everybody else has to pull
over and stop. For emergencies, and for public safety, that is accepted,
but what if UPS trucks had the same preference? Giving a preference
to the packets of some potentially degrades the transport for everyone
else.
The degradation of the speech of those who do not buy preferential
treatment, paired with the improved accessibility of the information
provided by paying speakers, will undermine the democratizing effect of
the Internet. Among the benefits of the Internet is that it enables those
who were formerly passive audience members to participate as speakers,
which greatly increases speech diversity. Access-tiering appears to
undermine a speaker's ability to reach an audience free of unnecessary
extraneous discrimination, as well as a listener's freedom to choose
among speakers according to his or her own criteria. Instead, network
operators will choose who will be able to reach an audience more easily,
and who the listeners will be able to hear more easily.
H. Recommendations
Network operators ought not to be permitted to block access to
websites unless the filtering is known to subscribers and in accordance
with their real interests and wishes. In other words, an ISP which offered
its subscribers spain filtering or firewalls would be assisting listeners in
giving effect to their own preferences with respect to content. An ISP

128. See Ganley & Allgrove, supra note 110, at 457 (noting that Verizon intends to reserve
eighty percent of its network in this way).

129. See Hearingon Net Neutrality, supra note 109, at 65 (statement of Gary R. Bachula, Vice
Pres., External Affairs, Internet2).
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that filtered out websites with which it disagreed or blocked access to
competing information providers would be undermining the freedom of
speech of speakers and listeners.
With respect to the access-tiering proposal of certain network
operators, some have suggested that it would be far less harmful if
network operators raised the revenues that they require for investment in
the network by increasing access fees to their subscribers.1 30 Different
rates can be charged to ensure that subscribers who make heavy use of
bandwidth contribute more to the construction of additional network
capacity, while access fees remain lower for light users. 31 They also
suggest that network operators be permitted to discriminate among
applications (e.g., 32data, streaming video, voice, etc.) but not among
content providers. 1

These suggestions would be better than access-tiering from the
perspective of free speech. It would be best for the network operators to
increase their revenues by charging higher access fees to all and by
ensuring that the arrangements between network operators fairly share
the high bandwidth fees paid by large content providers. To the extent
that this prices some retail subscribers out of the market, the government
130. See Hearing on Net Neutrality, supra note 109, at 12 (statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice
Pres. & Chief Internet Evangelist, Google, Inc.).
The broadband carriers already are fully compensated by their residential customers for
their use of the network. These companies can charge their own customers whatever they
want, in order to make back their investments. Trying to extract additional fees from
web-based companies-who are not in any way "customers" of the provider-would
constitute a form of "double recovery." Google takes no issue with the broadband
carriers' ability to set prices for Internet access that compensate for the costs and risks
associated with their network investments.
Id.
13 1. See Adam L. Penenberg, Internet Freeloaders: Should Google Have to Pay for the
Bandwidth it Consumes?, SLATE, Jan. 17, 2006, www.slate.com/id/2134397/.
132. See Hearing on Net Neutrality, supra note 109, at 12 (statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice
Pres. & Chief Internet Evangelist, Google, Inc.).
Some applications, such as voice over IP, take up very little bandwidth. Other activities,
such as multi-player real-time gaming or streaming video, may require more capacity.
However, such applications could be subject to additional customer charges, based on
the access speeds required (as opposed to the source, destination, or content of the
traffic)-but without discriminating based on who is providing the service.
Id.; see also Hearing on Net Neutrality, supra note 109, at 55 (statement of Lawrence Lessig, C.
Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Prof. of Law, Stanford Law School).
There's nothing wrong with network owners saying "we'll guarantee fast video service
on your broadband account." There is something wrong with network owners saying
"we'll guarantee fast video service from NBC on your broadband account." And there is
something especially wrong with network owners telling content or service providers
that they can't access a meaningful broadband network unless they pay an access-tax.
Id.; see also Ganley & Allgrove, supra note 110, at 463.
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might respond through targeted subsidization of poorer subscribers and
through improved public access points such as public libraries.
In addition, if network congestion is impeding the delivery of
certain types of applications, and capacity cannot be increased as quickly
as needed, then it may be necessary to introduce discrimination among
types of applications. However, the fees for the improved quality of
service for specific applications should be charged to listeners, and not
to speakers. This would avoid biasing speech using the new applications
in favour of wealthy speakers. Listeners would thus buy access to a
certain type of application and would select among all speakers using
that application rather than being restricted to those chosen by network
operators.
IV.

THE FREE SPEECH INTERESTS OF SELECTION INTERMEDIARIES

AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO REGULATION
This Article has suggested that we should view interference with a
speaker's ability to reach an audience as undermining the right of free
speech. It has further suggested that a speaker cannot expect more than
that listeners apply their own criteria for discriminating amongst
speakers, and so any selection intermediary that stays close to those
criteria would not be interfering with a speaker's right to reach an
audience.
The selection intermediaries discussed above, namely search
engines and network operators, have adopted or are contemplating
practices that introduce various forms of bias that listeners might not
have adopted. First, the removal of websites from search engine indices
or the blocking of websites by network operators may have this effect,
depending upon the reason for the removal. Second, measures that
discriminate in favor of certain websites in order to promote the
commercial or other interests of the network operator may also have this
effect. A rule of transparency with respect to the discriminatory
measures may be considered sufficient in some cases to remove the risk
to free speech values where a listener can change selection
intermediaries in order to find one whose criteria for discrimination are
close to the listener's own. However, where there is no choice and the
use of a selection intermediary is essential, a rule of transparency will
not be sufficient. For example, the discriminatory impact on speech that
may be caused by access-tiering would not be solved by merely
informing everyone of the practice if subscribers did not have
meaningful alternative sources of Internet access.
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If it is true that the impugned practices described in Part III can be
considered to undermine the free speech rights of speakers and listeners
on the Internet, this does not necessarily give rise to a First Amendment
claim against the selection intermediaries. On the contrary, Supreme
Court jurisprudence dealing with whether there is a First Amendment
right of expressive access to private property suggests that this type of
claim is unlikely to succeed.1 33 Indeed, several scholars have noted the
danger that First Amendment guarantees may be mostly unavailable in
the Internet
context since private actors are largely in control of speech
134
online.
Instead, if we wish to respond to the threats to free speech that are
posed by selection intermediaries, state involvement through regulation
may be required. However, regulations aimed at controlling the bias
introduced by selection intermediaries such as search engines and
network operators are vulnerable to the claim that they violate the First
Amendment rights of the intermediaries themselves. The measures
recommended above are of two main types. The first type includes
prohibitions on.blocking access to websites in a manner that listeners do
not know about or would not have chosen, such as the removal of
websites from search engine indices (or the refusal to index) or the
blocking of a website by a network operator. The second type are
regulations aimed at preventing selection intermediaries from
introducing extraneous bias into the relationship between speaker and
listener, either by manipulating search engine results to introduce
commercial or other bias (but excluding temporary manipulation to
respond to the abuse of the system by webmasters), or by introducing
commercial or other bias through the preferential treatment of certain
speakers by network operators.
The difficulty with these kinds of rules is that they may be
vulnerable to the argument that they constitute violations of the First
Amendment rights of the selection intermediaries. This argument might
take the form of a claim that the regulation is an impermissible
interference with editorial freedom, or that a regulation requiring a

133. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1972); Nunziato, supra note 77, at
1135-36 (tracing the history of the unsuccessful attempts to apply in the cyberspace context the
reasoning from Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) and Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (both holding that the First Amendment
protected expressive access to privately owned property under certain circumstances)).
134. See, e.g., Nunziato, supra note 77, at 1143; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace SelfGovernance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 459 (2000);

Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1667.
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selection intermediary to select a certain speaker constitutes compelled
speech. Indeed, these arguments have already been raised in the context
of search engines. The dispute in Search King, Inc. v. Google
Technology, Inc. 135 dealt with Google's reduction of the "PageRank" of
the plaintiffs website. Google argued, inter alia, that its website
rankings were speech protected by the First Amendment. 13 6 The Court
found that the rankings were opinions regarding the significance of
websites in relation to search queries, and that they were entitled to First
Amendment protection.13 7 Google has raised similar arguments in the
ongoing ranking dispute in Kinderstart.comLLC v. Google, Inc. 138
It seems likely that the courts would treat a selection intermediary's
choices as protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has
protected the editorial function of newspapers against governmentmandated inclusion of speech. 3 9 It has also recognized a cable system
operator's selection of which stations to carry 140 and a parade
organizer's selection of contingents to be included in a parade' 4' as
speech protected by the First Amendment. However, this freedom is not
absolute. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme
Court treated a rule requiring a cable system operator to set aside a
certain proportion of its carrying capacity for broadcast television
stations as constitutionally acceptable because the rule did not raise the
concerns that are typical in cases of "compelled speech."'' 42 The mustcarry rule was not an attempt to counterbalance the operator's own
speech, and it was content neutral. As a result, it would not interfere with
the cable operator's editorial discretion by encouraging it to change its
choices of programming in order to avoid triggering the must-carry rule,
nor would it cause the "cable operators to alter their own messages 1to
43
respond to the broadcast programming they are required to carry."'

135.

Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D.

Okla. May 27, 2003) (order granting Google's motion to dismiss).
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id. at 7. In addition, in Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc 'ns Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d
1070, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 1999), which dealt with a trademark dispute over the sale of advertising
attached to the plaintiffs trademark, the court held that search engine results are speech protected
by the First Amendment.
138. Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2006 WL 3246596 (N.D.
Cal. July 13, 2006). Note that the suit was dismissed, but Kinderstart was granted leave to amend
and refile, which it has done.
139. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
140. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 667-68 (1994).
141. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995).
142. Turner, 512 U.S. at 667-68.
143. Id. at 655.
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Turner also indicates that courts will monitor for the potential of the
monopolistic control of an information conduit.
The potential for abuse of this private power over a central avenue of
communication cannot be overlooked. The First Amendment's
command that government not impede the freedom of speech does not
disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical
pathway of
44
communication, the free flow of information and ideas.'
The relevance of a monopolistic opportunity to shut out speakers
was affirmed in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group.145 However, where monopolistic control does not exist, as was
held by a court with respect to Internet access, access requirements are
146
less likely to be upheld as constitutional.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & InstitutionalRights 147 addressed the question of compelled
speech. The case concerned an objection by law schools to a rule making
certain funding contingent on the schools' providing access for military
recruiters on the same terms as other recruiters. In a point relevant to the
present concern with discrimination among speakers, the Court drew a
distinction between a forced message and a rule prohibiting
discrimination in access among speakers, saying that the two are simply
not the same. 148 Furthermore, an access requirement becomes
objectionable when "the complaining speaker's own message [is]
affected by the speech it [is] forced to accommodate. '149 Another
relevant criterion is whether the complaining speaker would be viewed
as endorsing the speech it was required to accommodate. 50 The decision
in Forum did not address the full range of First Amendment concerns
raised in previous Supreme Court cases dealing with the constitutionality
of regulations providing for expressive access to private property. A

144. Id. at 657 (internal citation omitted).
145. 515 U.S. at 577-78.
146.

See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d

685, 696, 698 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
147. 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
148. Id. at 1308:
Compelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for other recruiters to send one
for a military recruiter is simply not the same as forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or
forcing a Jehovah's Witness to display the motto "Live Free or Die," and it trivializes the
freedom protecting in [our prior cases] to suggest that it is.

Id.
149.
150.

Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1310.
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review of a range of cases suggests that the following attributes raise
concerns from the First Amendment perspective:
(a) the speech that must be carried uses communicative space such
that the private
property owner's own ability to speak must be
151
curtailed;
(b) the access requirement enables the government to discriminate in
certain messages by dictating who is to be granted
favor of
152
access;
owner to
(c) the access requirement forces the private property
53
associate with messages that it finds objectionable;'
(d) the private property owner runs the risk that listeners will think it
endorses the messages where there is no practicable way to
disclaim its association with the messages;154
(e) the private property owner might be forced to speak in order to
respond to the messages it is required to carry; 155 and
speech in an effort to
(f) the private property owner may alter its own
56
avoid triggering the access requirement. 1
The case law also illustrates that the absence of these factors
weighs in support of an access regulation. For example, a regulation may
be acceptable where:
a government preference
(a) the access requirement does not embody
157
for particular speakers or messages;
does not deprive the property owner of its
(b) the access requirement
158
own ability to speak;
(c) a disclaimer would effectively permit the property owner to
dissociate itself from the speech granted mandatory access;159
would
(d) the history of the medium or location means that listeners
0
not assume that the property owner endorsed the speech;16

151. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1986)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (distinguishing PruneYard Shopping Cr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)
on this basis); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 580 (1995)
(same).
152. SeePacificGas,475 U.S. at 12-15.
153. Id. at 15-16.
154. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576-77.
155. PacificGas,475U.S. at 15 n.l.
156. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
157. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994); Pacifc Gas, 475 U.S. at 1213; PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
158. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579-80 (distinguishing PruneYard on this basis); Pacific Gas, 475
U.S. at 23-24 (Marshall, J., concurring) (same).
159. PruneYard,447 U.S. at 87.
160. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 655-56; PruneYard,447 U.S. at 87.
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(e) the access requirement would not cause the property owner to alter
its own message in order to respond;161 and
(f) the access requirement would not cause the private property owner
to alter its own
speech in order to avoid triggering the access
62
requirement.
In light of the foregoing, how would the recommended measures
fare against a selection intermediary's constitutional challenge?
Undoubtedly this would depend on how the rule is designed, and I have
done no more than roughly sketch potential rules. However, it seems that
a rule requiring transparency with respect to selection criteria would not
offend the First Amendment, particularly where there is the possibility
for listeners to be misled.
A prohibition against blocking access to websites or refusing to
include them in a search engine index would prima facie be an
interference with the selection intermediary's selection freedom.
However, the factors outlined above suggest that such a rule would not
raise the concerns typically associated with compelled speech. This is
because such a rule is content neutral, it would not curtail the selection
intermediary's ability to speak, the selection intermediary would not be
understood to endorse the website (or it could post disclaimers) and the
selection intermediary would not be forced to modify its own speech to
respond or to avoid triggering the rule.
The second group of recommended rules is aimed at preventing
selection intermediaries from introducing extraneous bias into the
relationship between speaker and listener, either by slanting search
engine results, or by introducing bias through access-tiering by network
operators. Once again, such rules would seem to constrain the full
exercise of "editorial freedom" by selection intermediaries by
prohibiting the preferential treatment of selected speakers. However,
with the possible exception of a network operator's complaint that its
inability to preferentially carry its own traffic curtails its own ability to
speak, such rules would not seem to raise the concerns associated with
compelled speech.

161. Turner, 512 U.S. at655.
162. Id. at 656; see also PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88 (distinguishing Tornillo on this basis).
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THE RIGHT TO REACH AN AUDIENCE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Yahoo!, Microsoft, and Google have recently come under intense
criticism for their apparent cooperation with the Chinese government's
online censorship and surveillance policies. 163 This concern has
of 2006164
culminated in the proposed Global Online Freedom Act
("GOFA"), which was introduced in the House of Representatives on
February 16, 2006. On June 22, 2006, a substitute version of GOFA
("GOFA (June)") was introduced in the Subcommittee on Africa, Global
Human Rights and International Operations. 165 The original version of
GOFA required United States content hosting and search engine
businesses operating in "Internet-restricting" countries not to comply
with those countries' filtering requirements.1 66 The substitute version has
significantly loosened these requirements, but continues to instruct
United States businesses to behave in a manner that may contravene
foreign laws. 167 The issue of the legitimacy of the extraterritorial
extension of United States law in this way seems not to have attracted
much attention. Nevertheless, it is an issue which ought to be
considered, and which may benefit from interpreting freedom of speech
as encompassing the ability to reach an audience.
China operates a system of Internet filtering. 68 A range of content,
including political dissent, as well as speech on religion and
pornography, is blocked. 169 This blocking is carried out at various layers

163. See AMNESTY INT'L, UNDERMINING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CHINA 4 (2006),
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_17068.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RACE TO
THE BOTTOM: CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP 4 (2006),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/china0806web.pdf.
164. H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006) (the preamble to the bill states that its purpose is "[t]o
promote freedom of expression on the Internet, [and] to protect United States businesses from
coercion to participate in repression by authoritarian foreign governments").
165. Markup Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Global Human Rights, and Int'l Operations of the
H. Comm. on Int'l Relations of H. Res. 860, H.R. 4319, H.R. 4780 and H.R. 5382, 109th Cong.,
H.R. REP. No. 109-173, at 80 (2006).
166. H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. §§ 101-02, 202 (2006).
167. Markup Before the Subcomm. on Aft., Global Human Rights, and Int'l Operations of the
H. Comm. on Int'l Relations of H. Res. 860, H.R. 4319, H.R. 4780 and H.R. 5382, 109th Cong.,
H.R. REP. No. 109-173, § 202, at 103 (2006).
168. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA IN 2004-2005: A COUNTRY STUDY
3 (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/ONIChinaCountry-Study.pdf.
169. See id. ("Chinese citizens seeking access to Web sites containing content related to
Taiwanese and Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, the Dalai Lama, the Tiananmen Square incident,
opposition political parties, or a variety of anti-Communist movements will frequently find
themselves blocked.").
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of the Internet infrastructure, including at the backbone level, by ISPs, as
well as by application service providers including search engines and
blog service providers.170
Human rights organizations have reported that search engines such
as Yahoo! assist with filtering.' 71 Yahoo! has responded that it filters in
compliance with Chinese laws, and that there is no alternative other than
to withdraw from doing business in China.172 It has stated that it "will
strive to achieve maximum transparency to the user" when it is required
to restrict search results. 73 Microsoft also removes results from its
search engine results in China, 74 and has also been criticized for
censoring Chinese bloggers who use certain politically sensitive words
in their blog postings in Microsoft's MSN spaces. 75 Under public
pressure, Microsoft has agreed to include notifications 76 to users
indicating when and why access to content has been blocked.
Google has also adjusted to Chinese censorship requirements in its
Google News service, leaving out links to headlines from sites that are
blocked by China. 177 Google also operates a censored version of its
search engine for China.' 78 Google does notify users that the "search
results are not complete, in accordance with Chinese laws and
regulations."'' 79 Google apparently also includes a link to the uncensored
Google.com, 80 although service quality is often degraded due to
censorship of those results at other levels, such as by ISPs.' 8'
As previously noted, GOFA was originally introduced in the House
of Representatives on February 16, 2006.182 On June 22, 2006, a
substitute version of GOFA was introduced in the Subcommitttee on
Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations.' 8 3 The
substitute Act contemplates restrictions on United States businesses

170. Id.
171. See id. at 18; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 163, at 32.

172. Id. at 38.
173. Id. at 39. In July 2006, Yahoo! began to include a Chinese disclaimer notice on its search
pages stating, "According to relevant laws and regulations, some search results may not appear." Id.
at 40.
174. Id. at 42.
175. Id. at 43.
176. Id. at 45, 50.
177. Id. at 54.
178.

Id. at55.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 58.
Id. at 61.
Seeid. at58-59&59n.121.
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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providing services in "designate[d] Internet-restricting countries.' 84 The
Act would initially designate specific countries, including China, as
"Intemet-restricting countries,"'' 85 and this list would be replaced with a
new 8one
prepared by the President six months after enactment of the
6
law. 1
Under § 202 of the original version of GOFA, businesses that
provide search engine services would be prohibited from altering the
187
operation of the search engine with respect to "protected filter terms'
at the request of the governments of "designate[d] Internet-restricting
countries," or in a manner that would be likely to produce different
search results for users accessing the service from within the designated
countries.1 88 This requirement was removed from GOFA (June).
Under § 203 of GOFA (June), businesses providing search engine
services would be required to report to a newly-created Office of Global
Internet Freedom the terms and requirements for filtering that are
specified to them by the governments of designated countries.' 89 In
addition, the revised law would require that any business providing
content hosting services provide to the Office of Global Internet
Freedom a URL link to all content that the business removes or blocks at
the request of the governments of specified countries.' 90
One of the problems with GOFA is that it would penalize United
States businesses for doing in a country such as China something that is
either legal there or required by Chinese law. Although the June version
substantially softens GOFA, removing many of the provisions that
would most likely require United States businesses to contravene foreign
184. See Markup Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Global Human Rights, and Int'l Operations of
the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations of H. Res. 860, H.R. 4319, H.R. 4780 and H.R. 5382, 109th Cong.,
H.R. REP. No. 109-173, §§ 201-06, at 101 (2006) (listing various restrictions on U.S. business and
potential civil and criminal penalties for violations). Pursuant to § 3(11), this would include entities
with a principal place of business in the United States or organized under a U.S. law, issuers of
securities registered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 781), and
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. businesses where the U.S. businesses either control the voting shares of
the subsidiary or authorize the acts of the subsidiary that are prohibited by GOFA.
185. Id. § 105(a)(3)(B), at 99.
186. Id. § 105(a)(l), at 99.
187. H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. §202 (2006). These protected filter terms would be specified by
a newly created Office of Global Internet Freedom. See id. §§ 104(a)-(b)(4)(A).
188. See id.
189. Markup Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Global Human Rights, and Int'l Operations of the
H. Comm. on Int'l Relations of H. Res. 860, H.R. 4319, H.R. 4780 and H.R. 5382, 109th Cong.,
H.R. REP. No. 109-173, § 203, at 104 (2006).
190. Id. § 204, at 104. The original version required that copies of all blocked or removed
information had to be sent to the Office of Global Internet Freedom. H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. § 205
(2006).
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laws, it retains the prohibition of blocking "United States-supported
Web site[s]" or "United States-supported content," 19 1 which includes
material created by the United States Government and governmentsupported international broadcasting entities. 192 Contravention of this
provision exposes United States businesses to both civil and criminal
penalties. 193
To the extent that GOFA requires actions to be taken (or not taken)
within China, it is an extraterritorial exercise of American legislative
jurisdiction. 194 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States sets out the bases of legislative jurisdiction that are
recognized under United States law. 195 The principle of territoriality is
the most commonly accepted basis for authority to prescribe, and grants
legislative jurisdiction to a country with respect to actions taking place
on its territory. 196 The so-called "effects doctrine" is treated by the
Restatement as an aspect of territorially-based jurisdiction. It suggests
that a state may assert jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
"conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory."'197 The United States has historically taken a
broad and controversial approach to effects-based jurisdiction,
98
recognizing jurisdiction where many other countries would not.,
Legislative jurisdiction may also be based on nationality. The
Restatement provides that a state may assert jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to "the activities, interests, status, or relations of its
nationals outside as well as within its territory."' 199 Once again, the
United States has tended to take a more permissive approach to its
191. Markup Before the Subcomm. on Aft., Global Human Rights, and Int'l Operations of the
H. Comm. on Int'l Relations of H. Res. 860, H.R. 4319, H.R. 4780 and H.R. 5382, 109th Cong.,

H.R. REP. No. 109-173, § 205, at 105 (2006).
192. Id. § 3(13), at 90.
193. Id. §206, at 105.
194. To the extent that filtering and blocking of content destined for China can be done outside
China, the extraterritoriality problem may not arise as starkly. However, where these actions take
place within China, an American legislative requirement that U.S. businesses operating in China do
so would be an extraterritorial extension of U.S. legislation.
195. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt.
c (1987).
196. Id.; Paul Coggins & William A. Roberts, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction: An Untamed
Adolescent, 17 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1391, 1392-93 (1991).
197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(l)(c)

(1987).
198. Id. § 401. "Controversy has arisen as a result of economic regulation by the United States
and others, particularly through competition laws, on the basis of economic effect in their territory,
when the conduct was lawful where carried out." Id. § 402 cmt. d.
199. Id. § 402(2).
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legislative jurisdiction than other countries, and the application of
United States laws to foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations
has been controversial abroad.200 The assertion of control over the acts
of foreign subsidiaries (which are non-nationals) in foreign jurisdictions
lacks a solid foundation in either the traditional territorial or nationality
bases of jurisdiction.2 °1
Even if one of the bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction applies, the
Restatement cautions that a state may still not exercise jurisdiction
where to do so would be unreasonable.20 2 Where it is reasonable for two
states to legislate, and the prescriptions are in conflict, the state with the
lesser interest should defer to the state whose interest is clearly
greater.20 3 A further provision dealing with conflicting prescriptions
provides that where the laws of the two states conflict, there is a
preference for the law of the state in which an act is to take place rather
than the state whose tie is based on nationality.20 4 This rule is not
absolute: Where the conduct abroad is particularly egregious, it may be
reasonable for the state of nationality to assert jurisdiction.20 5 In
addition, where the conduct abroad has direct effects in both the foreign

200. John Ellicott, Between a Rock and a HardPlace: How MultinationalCompanies Address
Conflicts Between U.S. Sanctions 'and Foreign Blocking Measures, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1365,
1366-67 (1998).
201. Id. at 1367.
202.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1)

(1987). Section 403(2) sets out the factors according to which reasonableness is to be assessed:
(a) [T]he link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or
between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international
system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403(2).
203. Id. § 403(3).
204. Id. §§ 441(a)-(b), 441(2)(a)-(b).
205. Id. § 441 cmt. b.
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state and the state of nationality, it may be reasonable for the state of
nationality to exercise jurisdiction. °6
It would seem that GOFA is on shaky ground with respect to its
claim to extraterritorial application. First of all, its prohibitions appear to
apply to non-nationals (i.e., foreign subsidiaries of United States
businesses) as well as nationals. 0 7 Second, if GOFA's requirements
apply to actions taken on the territory of a foreign country, which seems
likely to be the case at least some of the time, territorially-based
jurisdiction is also weak.
Although it is not well-accepted abroad, the "effects doctrine"
might offer some justification for GOFA, particularly when one takes a
more comprehensive approach to understanding the necessary elements
of the right of free speech. When one understands website blocking as a
wrong not just against the Chinese listeners but also against speakers
(United States speakers seeking to speak to willing Chinese listeners), a
more direct United States interest emerges. The "victims" of the filtering
carried out by United States companies and their foreign subsidiaries are
not just foreigners, but also include United States nationals, and the
effects are felt within the territory of the United States where those
Americans reside.
Some acknowledgement of these effects is contained within GOFA.
The bill suggests that political censorship degrades the quality of the
Internet in both the United States and abroad.20 8 It also suggests that the
transmission of uncensored information via the Internet implicates
United States export interests. 20 9 The bill also notes that Chinese
censorship harms the United States by promoting xenophobic
(particularly anti-American) nationalism in China.2 10
To this, one might add that foreign censorship has the further effect
within the United States of abridging the freedom of Americans to
communicate with interested Chinese listeners, undermining the
freedom of speech not just of Chinese citizens but also of Americans.
Although I am not convinced that GOFA is wise legislation, 2 11 the
206. Id.
207. Markup Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Global Human Rights, and Int'l Operations of the
H. Comm. on Int'l Relations of H. Res. 860, H.R. 4319, H.R. 4780 and H.R. 5382, 109th Cong.,
H.R. REP. No. 109-173, § 3(11), at 89 (2006).
208. Id. § 2(6), at 82.
209. Id.§2(5),at8l.
210. Id. § 2(12), at 83.
211. Some have suggested that GOFA would have counter-productive effects, reducing online
freedom if U.S. businesses decide to withdraw from China. See id. at 114 (statement of Rep. Earl
Blumenauer, D-Or.); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 163, at 47-48 (comments of a
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example is provided, nonetheless, as an illustration of how a more
comprehensive enumeration of the elements of free speech may affect
legal argument in a broad range of contexts.
VI.

CONCLUSION
,,212

in
The Internet has been "First Amendment manna from heaven,
many respects, appearing to solve the communications policy problems
of ensuring a diversity of voices as well as broad access to an effective
means of mass speech. However, the problem identified forty years ago
by Professor Jerome Barron is still alive in this new environment.
Speakers may now have access, but selection intermediaries may block
or bias the transmission of speech to listeners.
This Article has suggested that we must understand the type of
discrimination introduced by selection intermediaries as undermining the
values inherent in the First Amendment. The theories of free speech all
depend fundamentally on communication, within a relationship between
speaker and listener. As a result, it is not enough simply to be able to
speak or to receive information, the right to free speech must also protect
all steps in establishing and maintaining the communicative relationship.
This includes the processes of reaching an audience or finding a speaker.
These processes often rely on selection intermediaries to find, assess and
recommend information to listeners. Speakers and listeners alike have a
right to require that the listeners' own criteria for discrimination among
speakers, rather than the extraneous interests of selection intermediaries,
be applied. To the extent that search engines and network operators seek
to introduce other criteria of discrimination, they undermine the
advances for free speech that have been achieved by the Internet. The
fact that, in the past, we may have expected and tolerated the injection of
the selection intermediaries' own extraneous interests into the
relationship between speaker and listener does not mean that we must do
so now. With the Internet, we have an example illustrating that this is
not structurally necessary.
This Article has suggested some regulations designed to protect
against the injection of extraneous bias by selection intermediaries.
However, as Professor Barron pointed out long ago, First Amendment
jurisprudence offers arguments against government attempts to give

censored Chinese blogger); Eric J. Sinrod, Let Global Online Freedom Ring?, CNETNEWS.COM, July
5, 2006, http://news.com.com/Let+global+online+freedom+ring/2010-1028_3-6090725.html.

212.

Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1669.
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effect to free speech values by fostering expressive access to private
property. Although selection intermediaries have already raised the cries
of "editorial freedom" and "compelled speech," in private lawsuits
regarding selection bias, the kinds of regulations recommended in this
Article do not really raise the concerns typically associated with
compelled speech. It may be worthwhile, then, to consider legislative
intervention to protect the flow of information on the Internet.
This Article has also sought to illustrate the legal implications of
recognizing a right to reach an audience by pointing to the recent United
States Congressional consideration; of a law that would prohibit United
States businesses from blocking access to websites at the request of
foreign governments. Such legislation appears to have extraterritorial
reach that is not well-founded on the usual factors that justify
prescriptive jurisdiction (i.e., territory or nationality). If one re-examines
the question, taking into account the rights of United States speakers
seeking to speak to willing foreign listeners, an additional argument
might be made that foreign filtering and blocking of websites has effects
in the United States, thus engaging the American "effects doctrine" in
support of the legislation.
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